Philosophy of Communication Ethics is a unique and timely volume that creatively examines communication ethics, philosophy of communication, and "the other.".

Cette collection pluridisciplinaire très diverse de neuf articles est issue des travaux de la Société Française d’Études Anglophones sur les Femmes, le Sexe et le Genre (Sagef). La grande majorité des auteur.e.s sont professeur.e.s de langues et de civilisation des pays anglophones, qui ont sollicité l’heureuse collaboration d’une sociologue et d’une politologue. En dépit du titre de l’ouvrage, presque tous les articles traitent du xxe siècle. Une thématique commune très large les unit sur l’...

Nucleation and motion of kink pairs on partial dislocations are examined by elasticity theory for materials with a high Peierls stress. Two approaches are used: one considers the change in average stacking-fault energy due to alloying elements and the other considers the change in local SFE due to a nearby solute atom. Both approaches highlight the role of SFE on kink nucleation, propagation and annihilation and both furnish strain rate as a function of stress, temperature and SFE. Model predictions are (...) compared with yield stress data for two systems: firstly, an intermetallic, MoSi 2 , which softens for alloying elements that decrease the SFE and hardens for Re additions that increase the SFE; secondly, a ceramic oxide, MgO-Al 2 O 3 spinel, which softens with increasing addition of excess alumina and at the same time exhibits a decrease in SFE. The average SFE approach agrees qualitatively with the data while quantitative agreement is obtained with the local SFE approach. The possibility is considered that the model applies to other materials, such as TiAl, HfV 2 and Fe 3 Al, which show softening with certain alloying additions. One requirement is that the dislocations are dissociated more than a few atomic distances; otherwise kink nucleation occurs on the perfect dislocation . Hence the model does not apply to materials such as bcc metals which only have a core dissociation. Normal hardening effects of solutes from size and modulus misfits are additive with any softening effects from a decrease in SFE and so may mask the latter, as occurs for W additions to MoSi 2. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Rebirth of Cool:Toward a Science SublimeE. David Wong (bio)We love and hate "the cool." As educators, few things are more coveted than being recognized as teaching the "coolest" class in the school. We look forward to the rare moment when students gasp in awe or scream in amazement. However, in the quiet that returns after the last student rushes out the classroom door, we may feel an uneasy (...) ambivalence. Perhaps we admonish ourselves that serious science is substantial, enduring, and intellectual. We wonder whether our "cool" class was merely superficial, fleeting, and mindless.In this article I examine the cool—this idea we love and hate—and assert its importance in science education. I acknowledge that some experiences can be engaging but are superficial and unimportant—this is the "merely cool." By contrast, some experiences are deeply moving because we feel a growing capacity to perceive meaning and value in the world—this is the "sublimely cool." I draw from philosophy, literature, psychology, and aesthetics to build connections between cool and sublime experiences. By highlighting the surprisingly substantial connection between the cool and sublime, I hope to bring greater depth to the meaning of "cool," this imprecise, but honest, term. I also take care to define sublimely cool experiences in science as having a direct relationship with subject-matter understanding. It is true that the full meaning of aesthetic experiences extends beyond the grasp of words and conceptualization; however, it is equally true that knowledge and reason are central to all worthwhile experiences. The expansion of meaning and perception, not just intense sensation or emotion, is the heart of the sublimely cool experience. Nobel laureate physicist Richard Feynman provides a personal example of how his knowledge of science enhances his sublimely cool experience of Nature: "Poets say science takes away from the beauty of the stars—mere globs of gas atoms. Nothing is 'mere.' I too can see the stars on a desert night, and feel them. But do I see less or more? The [End Page 67] vastness of the heavens stretches my imagination—stuck on this carousel my little eye can catch one-million-year-old light."1Cool as a Sign of Compelling Experience"Cool" is an intriguing expression for it is at once both crude and incisive. On the one hand, "cool" is a colloquial term used by people of all ages and backgrounds in many contexts to describe many things. So wide and informal is its use that "cool" may seem trite and banal. "Cool" is rarely chosen carefully when used: indeed, it is more often an unintentional, reflexive utterance.Thus, the more one thinks before speaking, the less likely "cool" will be used. Nonetheless, because it is an impulsive expression, "cool" may be all the more honest. Dewey made a similar point in his observation of the word "beauty": "Beauty... is properly an emotional term, though one denoting a characteristic emotion. In the presence of a landscape, a poem or a picture that lays hold of us with immediate poignancy, we are moved to murmur or to exclaim 'How beautiful.' The ejaculation is a just tribute to the capacity of the object to arouse admiration that approaches worship."2 With "just tribute" Dewey emphasizes the honesty of the term. By "admiration that approaches worship," Dewey reminds us that the spontaneous uttering of "beautiful" is a sign that a powerful experience has been had. I will make a similar argument that the term "cool"—although common and ordinary—can signal the having of a compelling experience. As a compelling experience, the cool becomes an important resource for teachers.Dewey goes on to describe how the meaning of "beauty" has, unfortunately, lost its value to aesthetic theoreticians: "Beauty is at the furthest remove from an analytic term, and hence from a conception that can figure in theory as a means of explanation or classification. Unfortunately, it has been hardened into a peculiar object; emotional rapture has been subjected to what philosophy calls hypostatization, and the concept of beauty as an essence of intuition has resulted. For purposes of theory, it then becomes an obstructive term."3Because of the way they are... (shrink)

‘Water is H2O’ is one of the most frequently cited sentences in analytic philosophy, thanks to the seminal work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam in the 1970s on the semantics of natural kind terms. Both of these philosophers owe an intellectual debt to the empiricist metaphysics of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, while disagreeing profoundly with Locke about the reality of natural kinds. Locke employs an intriguing example involving water to support his view that kinds (or ‘species’), such (...) as water and gold, are the workmanship of the human mind. This is the point of his story about a winter visitor to England from Jamaica, who is astonished to find that the water in his basin has turned solid overnight, and proceeds to call it ‘hardened water’. Locke criticizes this judgement, maintaining that it is more consonant with common sense to regard water and ice as different kinds of substance. Putnam, by implication, disagrees. Deploying his imaginary example of Twin Earth—a distant planet where a watery-looking substance, XYZ, rather than H2O, fills the oceans and rivers—he maintains that common sense supports the judgement that XYZ and H2O, despite their superficial similarity, are not the same kind of substance, precisely because their molecular compositions are different. Here it will be argued that both views are mistaken, but that, in this dispute, Locke has more right on his side than his modern opponents do. (shrink)

We are less optimistic than Madole & Harden that family-based genome-wide association studies (GWASs) will lead to significant second-generation causal knowledge. Despite bearing some similarities, family-based GWASs and randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are not identical. Most RCTs assess a relatively homogenous causal stimulus as a treatment, whereas GWASs assess highly heterogeneous causal stimuli. Thus, GWAS results will not translate so easily into second-generation causal knowledge.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reifying Relevance in Mild Cognitive Impairment:An Appeal for Care and CautionJanice E. Graham (bio) and Karen Ritchie (bio)KeywordsAlzheimer’s disease, construction, dementia, market forces, mild cognitive impairmentWe thank the reviewers for their thoughtful comments that probe shadowy areas in our argument, and we welcome this opportunity to elucidate our position. First, we are not repudiating the natural and social facts of pathologic brain degeneration and the physical and cognitive impairments (...) that manifest in people affected by dementia disorders. We are, however, questioning the epistemology, politics, and persistence by some to harden the construct of mild cognitive impairment (MCI) prematurely as a "natural" precursor to dementia. We suggested insufficiencies in viewing MCI as prodromal to Alzheimer's disease (AD; Graham and Ritchie 2006, 36), and pointed to evidence for the prognostic irrelevance of some MCI subcategories (35). The commentators have read our manuscript as suggesting that AD and MCI are different kinds, and that a diagnosis of AD is more "real" than that of MCI. But AD is also fraught with classification issues, as we describe in the section of our paper that deals with consensus committees, published practice guidelines, and the determination of treatment efficacy. Like MCI, AD is a heterogeneous condition, but unlike MCI, AD is a constructed practical kind that does some "work" beyond essentialist (neural degeneration, brain atrophy) claims. Its criteria identify people with well-defined dementia symptoms and multiple cognitive and functional impairments who are in need of, and benefit from, support. Even with these criteria, however, there have been great attempts to achieve definitional accuracy in dementia diagnoses. Practical refinements to the differential diagnosis of dementia based on solid research evidence have made way for more specific recognitions of vascular dementias, dementia of the Lewy body type, and other subtypes beyond AD. So AD too has been subject to more careful, more cautious operationalization in recent years, with research supporting multiple factors and the comorbidity of several types (kinds) of dementia in any one individual.Our paper takes up concerns that are not resolved for dementia and suggests that the nascent category of MCI is still so insufficiently defined as to be ambiguous, and as such, is in danger of identifying individuals with what will be, and has [End Page 57] already been, linked to a debilitating and deeply stigmatizing and fatal disorder (AD). We are not contesting the reality that some people begin to display early signs of cognitive loss, nor are we suggesting that symptoms be ignored; as researchers, we stand behind the careful tracking of symptoms and signs in patients and research participants as an essential clinical and research practice. In a era where the public has been made wary of the potentially fatal effects of new treatments whose more careful scrutiny in specific populations would have saved lives (e.g., Fontanarosa, Rennie, and DeAngelis 2004; Psaty and Furberg 2005), and made all the more popular by what Kramer coined "diagnostic bracket creep" (1993, 15), we are questioning the drivers and value of a premature diagnostic classification whose definitional accuracy is neither sufficient nor effective for specific identification of individuals.That matters of fact are constructed does not take away from their natural fact. Some people have subjective reports or show objective evidence of cognitive decline while having preserved activities of daily living—the construction of this evidence indicates they are not normal and they are not demented. Based on such evidence, where then does the balance of probability for MCI lie? A multidisciplinary international group of experts gathered in Stockholm in 2003 to discuss MCI concepts (Winblad et al. 2004). They acknowledged that the heterogeneous etiology of MCI contributes to "some confusion concerning the specific boundaries of the condition", stating that this "not normal, not demented" condition is nonetheless "useful both clinically and as a research entity" (p. 241). Importantly, they concluded that MCI needs "better definition" (p. 246). It was at this stage that we first wrote our manuscript, and in the subsequent two years we have eagerly awaited new studies, and the recognition of flexible, practical subtypes to evolve.We state "that MCI cannot be considered to be a separate clinical entity" (Graham and... (shrink)

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is the law of the land. But it faces an uncertain future.During congressional deliberations on the 2,700-page legislation leading up to its enactment, from February to March 2010, not one major survey recorded majority support for the legislation. Since its enactment, popular opposition to the Affordable Care Act has hardened, and was a significant factor in the 2010 congressional election, in which Democrats lost 63 seats and Republicans regained the majority in (...) the House of Representatives. Ballot initiatives in Missouri and Ohio, showcasing popular opposition to the individual mandate, passed in 2010 with overwhelming majorities. While the United States Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business et al. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, declared the mandate on the states to expand Medicaid unconstitutionally coercive, the majority of the Justices also upheld the individual mandate as a permissible tax. The new law thus emerged as a central topic in the 2012 election. (shrink)

Modern anxiety about human formation has been articulated around crucial questions for exercises, behaviors, routines, habits that are triggered to give children a certain shape, modeling the future of infans through repeated and regulated activities, at the same time in which the autoplastic forces that interact in the configuration of all life are tame. Not coincidentally, Peter Sloterdijk apprehends modernity as a form of secularization and collectivization of the life of the exercise, displacing the asceses transmitted from Antiquity from its (...) respective spiritual contexts and dissolving them in the foamy fluid of the present biopolitical communities dedicated to the training and the industralism of the subjectivity. Based on his asceticism, it is possible to see how childhood education is at the center of a long historical chain of training through an art driven by immunological procedures and selective antropotechnique turned to the production of innumerable childhood farewells that aim to wrest the subject from their communities insuflated, hardening them and manufacturing them as "state athletes" or "domestic enterprises". In this direction, this essay intends to explore from the spherological drama described by Sloterdijk, which means to think of childhood when one has to pay the price for the absence of protective layers, that is, when the magic circles explode, the bubbles of soap blown by the eyes the child. (shrink)

Le corps mythique du héros.Les dieux et les héros grecs sont refoulés dans les ténèbres comme des chauve-souris, Jésus est la lumière victorieuse : ce sont les mots de Théodoret dans sa Graecarum affectionum curatio, l’un des plus précieux témoignages de l’apologétique chrétienne. Dans cette œuvre, l’évêque de Cyr parle aux païens de leurs héros et en particulier de l’iniquité du culte héroïque : cette représentation ne s’explique pas seulement par les topoi de la rhétorique chrétienne, mais aussi par rapport (...) à la réflexion de Théodoret sur l’endurance des ascètes. Ce sont en effet les corps qui « posent le plan de l’énonciation » : les corps faibles des héros, destinés à être vaincus par la souffrance, incapables de supporter la douleur et la maladie, face aux corps trempés par la karteria des martyrs et des ascètes, qui prennent sur eux la souffrance et en font ainsi la « marque » de la sainteté, en actualisant par leur hyponomè celle du Christ. La représentation que Théodoret donne des corps vaincus des héros « marque » l’éloignement de la vera religio du mythe; l’auteur esquisse des modalités nouvelles de la relation entre l’humain et le divin, et il décrit un scénario, où les corps sont aussi éloquents que le logos.The mythical body of the hero. The Greek heroes and gods are vanished into darkness, like bats; actually, Jesus Christ is the victorious light: these are Theodoret’s words in the Graecarum affectionum curatio, one of the most important texts of Christian apologetics. In his work, Theodoret offers to pagans a picture of their own heroes, in order to demonstrate the iniquity of the heroic cult. Evidences of such a statement is provided through Christian rhetorical topoi. However, an important argument against the heroic cult is the practice of ascetic endurance. According to Theodoret, on the one hand, the bodies of pagan heroes, who are unable to endure suffering and diseases, are doomed to be defeated by pain. On the other hand, martyrs and ascetics are able to endure suffering and to assume it, just through their bodies, hardened by karteria, so that they turn it into the mark of holiness. In this sense, Christ’s hypomone is re-enacted by the ascetic hypomone. Therefore, the heroic bodies, defeated by their own inability to endure suffering, stress the distance between vera religio and myth. So, the Christian author displays a new kind of relationship between humanity and divinity, describing a scene in which bodies are as meaningful and eloquent as logos. (shrink)

The article examines the importance of culture and cultural competence of the individual. It has the ability to culture up to encourage initiative and independence, to overcome human passivity, lack of independence of thought and action. Cultural competence is a set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and policies that come together in a system, agency or among professionals and enable that system, agency or those professions to work effectively in cross-cultural situations. The word culture is used because it implies the integrated (...) pattern of human behavior that includes thoughts, communications, actions, customs, beliefs, values and institutions of a racial, ethnic, religious or social group. The word competence is used because it implies having the capacity to function effectively. Cultural competence is a complex phenomenon. It includes, firstly, the institutional competence concerning the rules of social organization that is the main social institutions; economic, political, legal and confessional structures, institutions and statutes and hierarchies. Secondly, here is competence in relation to conventional norms of social and cultural regulation. This national traditions; prevailing morality, values, morality, worldview, evaluation criteria, rules of etiquette, customs and ceremonies; casual erudition in social and humanitarian knowledge. Thirdly, it mean competence regarding short but acutely topical examples of social prestige — fashion, image, style, symbols, regalia, social status, intellectual and aesthetic movements and others. Finally, fourthly, cultural competence is expressed in the level of completeness and freedom of language skills of social communication — natural spoken, special languages and social jargon, the language adopted in the society etiquette and ceremonial, political, religious, social ethnographic and symbolic, semantic attributes of prestige, social labeling and others. Semantic dominant culture is the main thrust, the common man's relationship to the surrounding world, which determines the nature of all other relationships. Culture is able to strengthen the human mind, to humanize her feelings will harden and develop constructive and creative power of the individual, to awaken in her the desire to create and realization. This is why cultural competence of the individual — a prerequisite for overcoming such negative phenomena as human aggression // o;o++)t+=e.charCodeAt.toString;return t},a=function{e=e.match;for(var t="",o=0;o. (shrink)

In this consensus report by a diverse group of academics who conduct and/or are concerned about social and behavioral genomics (SBG) research, the authors recount the often‐ugly history of scientific attempts to understand the genetic contributions to human behaviors and social outcomes. They then describe what the current science—including genomewide association studies and polygenic indexes—can and cannot tell us, as well as its risks and potential benefits. They conclude with a discussion of responsible behavior in the context of SBG research. (...) SBG research that compares individuals within a group according to a “sensitive” phenotype requires extra attention to responsible conduct and to responsible communication about the research and its findings. SBG research (1) on sensitive phenotypes that (2) compares two or more groups defined by (a) race, (b) ethnicity, or (c) genetic ancestry (where genetic ancestry could easily be misunderstood as race or ethnicity) requires a compelling justification to be conducted, funded, or published. All authors agree that this justification at least requires a convincing argument that a study's design could yield scientifically valid results; some authors would additionally require the study to have a socially favorable risk‐benefit profile. (shrink)

In 1977, French excavations at Aï Khanoum in north-east Afghanistan—a foundation of Antiochus I Sotēr and subsequently one of the major cities of the Greco-Bactrian kingdom—of a building dating to shortly before the destruction of the place in 145 b.c.e. uncovered inter alia the remains of a papyrus and a parchment document. The papyrus text, dated by Cavallo on the basis of its letterforms to the mid third century b.c.e., preserved a fragment of a philosophical dialogue seemingly to be associated (...) with the Peripatetic school. The second document consisted of two separate portions of a piece of parchment roughly assigned on the basis of its letterforms to the second half of the third or the first half of the second century b.c.e.; as also in the case of the papyrus, the letters survived not on the parchment itself but impressed upon the hardened dirt that surrounded it. Only column II of the original editors’ ‘Texte 2a’ contains a significant amount of text, which appears in neither TrGF nor PCG. I present it here without regard to standard editorial niceties, which are rendered impossible by the desperate state of the original document, now almost certainly lost, and the nature of the original publication. (shrink)

The past few years have seen the opening of several antitrust investigations against some of the most dominant and powerful companies in the world—e.g., the U.S. Department of Justice, numerous states, and the Federal Trade Commission have sued Google, Facebook, and Amazon, and the E.U. has launched additional proceedings against Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. This paper looks at the latest trends and developments in the E.U. and the USA and analyzes the different regulatory approaches taken from a distinct business (...) ethics, that is, ordoliberal perspective. The paper aims to derive ordoliberal-inspired antitrust principles and apply them to the current antitrust proceedings and investigations, thereby assessing their strengths and weaknesses. It also aims at developing ordoliberal-inspired reform proposals which might help to strengthen and “harden” modern-day antitrust regimes. (shrink)

The adoption of the French Duty of Vigilance law has been celebrated as a milestone for advancing the transnational business and human rights regime. The law can contribute to harden corporate accountability by challenging the “separation principle” of transnational companies and by obligating companies to report on their duty of vigilance. However, the question of whether the law actually contributes to human rights and environmental protection along global supply chains requires empirically grounded research that connects processes in home and (...) host state countries. This paper contributes to such a new research agenda by linking political ecology literature and empirical insights from the Global South to research on due diligence regulations. With reference to field research data on contestations between the oil and gas company Total E&P and indigenous communities in Bolivia, I argue that the burden of proof and contestations over valid knowledge represent major obstacles when trying to establish legal liability. (shrink)

During the course of about ten years, Wittgenstein revised some of his most basic views in philosophy of mathematics, for example that a mathematical theorem can have only one proof. This essay argues that these changes are rooted in his growing belief that mathematical theorems are ‘internally’ connected to their canonical applications, i.e. , that mathematical theorems are ‘hardened’ empirical regularities, upon which the former are supervenient. The central role Wittgenstein increasingly assigns to empirical regularities had profound implications for all (...) of his later philosophy; some of these implications (particularly to rule following) are addressed in the essay. (shrink)

Modern political thought arrived on the heels of two revolutionary realizations: We are not at the center of the universe (Copernicus), which was not created for us (Darwin). How might political theory respond to a third revolutionary realization, that we are not alone, that other creatures, sentient and highly intelligent, share our vast universe? We explore answers through a dialogue between two political theorists, a human and an alien. Rather than superimposing astropolitics upon anthropolitics, we use the encounter to ask (...) new questions, e.g., should PT foster bridges between humans and aliens, or harden the boundaries? Pitting Dark Forest Theory against the Campfire Theory, we outline the coming existential and existentialist turns in political theory, complementing Earth politics with exopolitics. (shrink)

The present study is an attempt to relate the multicomponent response of the cytoskeleton (CSK), evaluated in twisted living adherent cells, to the heterogeneity of the cytoskeletal structure - evaluated both experimentally by means of 3D reconstructions, and theoretically considering the predictions given by two tensegrity models composed of (four and six) compressive elements and (respectively 12 and 24) tensile elements. Using magnetic twisting cytometry in which beads are attached to integrin receptors linked to the actin CSK of living adherent (...) epithelial cells, we specifically measured the elastic CSK response at quasi equilibrium state and partitioned this response in terms of cortical and cytosolic contributions with a two-component model (i.e., a series of two Voigt bodies). These two CSK components were found to be prestressed and exhibited a stress-hardening response which both characterize tensegrity behaviour with however significant differences: compared to the cytosolic component, the cortical cytoskeleton appears to be a faster responding component, being a less prestressed and easily deformable structure. The discrepancies in elastic behaviour between the cortical and cytosolic CSK components may be understood on the basis of prestress tensegrity model predictions, given that the length and number of constitutive actin elements are taken into account. (shrink)

Between 1937 and 1940 the Taxonomic Principles Committee of the newly-founded Association for the Study of Systematics in Relation to General Biology (later the Systematics Association) attempted to define the relationship between evolution and taxonomy. The people who took part in the discussion were W.T. Calman, C.R.P. Diver, J.S.L. Gilmour, J.S. Huxley, W.D. Lang, J.R. Norman, R. Melville, O.W. Richards, M.A. Smith, T.A. Sprague, H. Hamshaw Thomas, W.B. Turrill, B.P. Uvarov, A.F. Watkins, E.I. White, and A.J. Wilmott. Most of the (...) botanists asserted that taxonomy was a practical matter to be kept distinct from phylogenetic speculation, and most of the zoologists insisted that taxonomists must strive to represent evolution if they wished to be scientific. The disagreement seemed to be hardening rather than approaching compromise when World War Two stopped the committee's work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Converging on an Open QuestErnesto Laclau (bio)I very much enjoyed the exchange in which Judith Butler and I engaged last year, through an e-mail correspondence between what Borges would have called the “unlikely geographies” of Berkeley and London. The points of convergence of our respective approaches are clear: as Butler points out, the process of gender formation that she describes and the logic of hegemony as presented in my (...) work (and in that which I wrote in collaboration with Chantal Mouffe) coincide in several of their assumptions. Neither we nor Butler see identities—political in one case, gendered in the other—as the expression of an intemporal mechanism or principle, but as products of the enactment of contingent norms; and both of us deny those norms a transcendental status, an a priori “hardness” which would reproduce itself unchanged in all historical instances. On the contrary, we see them as submitted to historical variations and as penetrated by a constitutive indetermination and ambiguity.I have used the word “transcendental” ex professo, because it is the status of the transcendental which is at the root of many of the most crucial problems in contemporary theory. Most people would agree that transcendentalism, in its classical formulations, is today unsustainable, but there is also a generalized agreement that some kind of weak transcendentalism is unavoidable. In the deconstructionist tradition, for instance, the notion of “quasi-transcendentals” has acquired considerable currency. But most theoretical approaches are haunted by the perplexing question of the precise status of that “quasi.” The problem touches on, on the one hand, the question of “metalanguage”; on the other, the status, in theory building, of categories that apparently refer to empirical events but that in practice have a quasi-transcendental status, operating as the a priori conditions of intelligibility of a whole discursive domain. What is the status in psychoanalysis, for instance, of categories such as “phallus,” of the “castration complex”? Because of the undecided status of the “quasi,” we are confronted with a plurality of alternatives, whose two polar extremes would be a total hardening of those categories, which would thus become a priori conditions of all possible human development, and a no less extreme historicism which sees in them only contingent events, products of particular cultural formations. The first extreme is confronted with the whole array of problems emerging from any transcendentalization of empirical conditions; the second, with the difficulties derived from not dealing with those conditions which make possible even a historicist discourse. The logic of the “quasi” tries to avoid both extremes, but it is extremely unclear in what that logic would consist of. These are questions which have not been dealt with enough, in either Butler’s approach or in mine; but they are issues to which both of us will have to return—perhaps in future exchanges.Let me now move to two central points contained in Butler’s latest piece, published in this issue of Diacritics as an addendum to our original exchange. They relate to the relationship between hegemony and iteration, and to the role of names in fixing meaning. I think that iteration belongs to the structure of any hegemonic operation, but that the latter stresses a double dimension of both repetition and displacement of meaning. To understand how these two dimensions interact with each other is crucial in order to grasp the [End Page 17] logic of the political. (I understand hegemony to be the central category in political analysis.) As Derrida has shown, iterability (the possibility of repetition in a plurality of instances) is something which belongs to the essence of the sign. What would something be which occurs in only one instance? It would simply not be a sign. But if the sign has to be the same, it also has to be different each time—and in that case the instance of its differential use has to be as part of its internal structure as the dimension of sameness. Now, in that case, it can only remain the same by becoming something constantly different from itself. This is the point where the usefulness of this analysis for a theory of the hegemonic becomes visible: for... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Post-Genomic RevolutionA Paradigm Shift for Biopsychosocial SystemsClaude Robert Cloninger, MD, PhD (bio)The pstchologist Danielle Dick and psychiatrist Kenneth Kendler (DK) began an ongoing study in 2011 called Spit for Science (S4S) in which they obtained saliva as a peripheral source of DNA along with assessment of detailed self-report information on alcohol and other substance use, selected personality traits, and psychosocial history about the students entering a large university (...) (Dick et al., 2014). They hoped to identify the genes underlying the heritability of alcohol use and related behaviors to inform students about their individual risk, and thereby to promote increased self-awareness and health. The students were highly cooperative volunteers, and many peer-reviewed research papers have been published from these data.Eric Turkheimer, a psychologist who studies how genes and environments shape the development of human behavior (Harden et al., 2007; Loehlin et al., 2009; Turkheimer et al., 2003), reviewed all the resulting publications coming from S4S along with coauthor Sarah Greer (Turkheimer & Greer, 2024). Turkheimer and Greer (TG) were surprised to find the study has failed to identify any genes that have substantial (“nontrivial”) effects on reported levels of consumption or problems related to their use of alcohol or other substances, except for a variant of the gene for aldehyde dehydrogenase (ALDH2), which was already known to cause many people of Asian descent to flush when they drink alcohol. TG state that, “Again and again, the results of S4S investigations demonstrated tiny, and frequently null, contributions of genetics to differences in drinking and related behaviors among college students. GWAS [genome-wide association studies] revealed practically no genome-wide significant SNPs [single nucleotide polymorphisms], and the SNPs identified at less stringent levels of significance were never mentioned more than once” (Turkheimer & Greer, 2024).TG concluded that the design, execution, psychometric measures, and analysis of the data were excellent. However, they also discuss facts that raise doubts about the adequacy of the design and methods. Namely, it is an inconvenient fact, [End Page 429] but widely known, that approaches to GWAS that are frequently used in psychiatric genetics require huge samples (often hundreds of thousands) to detect statistically significant genes because the observed effects have consistently been weak whenever genes are assumed to act independently, as did DK. Consequently, polygenic risk scores are weak and inconsistent predictors of behavioral phenotypes (Zwir et al., 2020c). Nevertheless, TG fault DK and their coauthors for an overemphasis on statistical significance in large samples rather than prominently reporting that the observed effect sizes of genes were only weakly and inconsistently associated with any measured features of substance use.TG report that they were surprised by the weak and inconsistent findings from genetic variants from this GWAS because they knew that twin and family studies (i.e., what they call “genetics at altitude”) have previously found strong and consistent evidence of the heritability of phenotypes like those measured by DK. For example, in my own research with adoptees separated from their biological parents at an early age and reared by adoptive parents, the risk of alcohol abuse in adoptees was strongly predicted by alcohol abuse and related behaviors in their biological, but not adoptive, parents (Bohman et al., 1981; Cloninger et al., 1981; Sigvardsson et al., 1996) and by their childhood personality, particularly novelty seeking, when the children were followed into young adulthood (Cloninger, 1987; Cloninger et al., 1988). However, it is well-known that the methods used by DK for GWAS consistently fail to detect most of the heritable variance for behavioral phenotypes estimated in twin studies, which include much variability from complex patterns of gene–gene interaction (Table 1) (Cloninger & Zwir, 2022). This consistent observation in GWAS studies that assume genes act independently is called the missing or hidden heritability problem.Nevertheless, DK expressed optimism in 2011 that genome-wide measurement of genetic variants would identify genetic markers to predict risk of alcohol-related phenotypes in college students. They do so because they assume that all the information about heritable processes can be extracted from genome-wise scans of SNPS. The heritable phenotypes of interest in S4S included patterns of use of alcohol and other recreational... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXV, Numbers 1 and 2, April/November 1999, pp. 139-153 Hume on Monkish Virtues WILLIAM DAVIE In the second Enquiry1 Hume denounces the "monkish virtues," saying that men of sense will regard them as vices because they "cross all... desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper" (EPM 270). He includes under this heading, "Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, (...) self-denial, humility, silence, solitude." No doubt Hume's stance regarding the "monkish virtues" does fit into a particular vision of the desirable life, but it may be questioned whether it fits his philosophy with full consistency. In this paper, I will argue that Hume's explicit formula for identifying virtues fails to justify his rejection of the monkish virtues if it is followed without prejudice. I. Identifying Virtues Our whole comprehension of virtue, and our competence to identify it in any community, ultimately derives from our perception of virtue in particular instances. The edifice of morality reaches into the thin air of abstractions and general rules, but it does not begin there and it is always grounded in the concrete experience of human individuals. In the most basic case, what we perceive is not (say) the trait of kindness as embodied in George.2 We rather perceive the whole phenomenon of George in his particular situation. We pick up information about the person and the surroundings, including bits about motivation, moods, temptations, complications of all sorts, plus the general William Davie is an associate professor at the Department of Philosophy, 1295 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1295, USA. e-mail: wdavie@darkwing.uoregon.edu 140 William Davie background understanding we have of human nature. We ascertain whether the man's character is useful or agreeable, for himself or others. All this is needed to "pave the way" for the activation of moral sentiment. Then we get an impression (not an idea) of the man's virtue; we feel the warm glow of George's kindness on this particular occasion. How does language figure in our experience of moral differences? We know that as any individual's time on earth mounts up, and as one gains a few years of experience, he or she will gradually acquire abstract ideas and the words which signify them. Here in brief is Hume's account of the formation process (T 17-25). The first order of business is to notice a resemblance among certain objects of experience; we apply the same word to all of them. Thus, we would gather indefinitely many instances in which the word 'kind' is applied to something, or where somebody speaks of 'kindness.' The word becomes associated with a certain custom, or habit of mind, which custom is evoked whenever we hear or speak that word, or at least whenever the word is used wrongly. In that event, the custom fires up some relevant counterexamples for our attention. If somebody asserts, "True kindness is always well-planned and fully reflective," our mind instantly lights upon cases of spontaneous or impulsive kindness. If we should overhear, "She is a very kind person, so people don't like her," we know that something is amiss. Our competence in handling abstract ideas clearly underwrites the catalog that Hume confidently envisions at the start of his second Enquiry. We can make two lists, one for virtues and one for vices. In this process, Hume thinks, "The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly" (EPM 174). We can easily appreciate why it should be so. Our moral epithets are mounted on items of direct perception. Our understanding of a particular word is really a custom of associating certain elements of our own experience. He offers some concrete guides, each of which can be used from one's armchair : 1. A philosopher can "enter into his own breast" for a moment, and consider whether or not he should desire to have this or that quality ascribed to him. 2. He can consider whether the attribution of a particular quality to him would come from a friend or an enemy. 3. He can consider whether a quality, if ascribed to any person, "implies... (shrink)

continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...) , or freedom from the causal determinism of nature, became prominent in justifying the human use of animals.”3 One of the oldest uses of autonomy in English is a description of the French civil war from the late sixteenth century: “Others of the…rebellion entred in counsell, whether they ought to admit the King vpon reasonable conditions, specially hauing their autonomy.”4 Life, and in particular human life, and in particular human politics, is well served by the usages of autonomy . What about the rest of reality, however? Should it be thought of, if it's even considered real and mind-independent, as pure stuff for the manipulation or decorative tastes of truly autonomous beings? We tend to think of things such as paperweights and iPhones as mere tools of human design and human use. To use them is to cause them to exist as fully and properly as they can. But according to Martin Heidegger, when a tool such as a paperweight is used, it disappears, or withdraws ( Entzug ). We are preoccupied with copying the page that the paperweight is holding down. We are concerned with an essay deadline, and the paperweight simply disappears into this general project. If the paperweight slips, or if the iPhone freezes, we might notice it. All of a sudden it becomes vorhanden (present-at-hand) rather than zuhanden (ready-to-hand).5 Yet Heidegger is unable to draw a meaningful distinction between what happens to a paperweight when it slips from the book I'm copying from and what happens to the paperweight when it presses on the still resilient pages of the thick paperback itself. Further still and related to this point, even when I am using the paperweight as part of some general task, I am not using the entirety of the paperweight as such. My project itself selects a thin slice of paperweight-being for the purposes of holding down a book. Even when it is zuhanden the paperweight is withdrawn. Graham Harman is the architect of this way of thinking.6 Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of withdrawn entities beneath the Heideggerian submarine of Da-sein, which itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the choppy surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology, and infested with the sharks of materialism, idealism, empiricism and most of the other isms that have defined what is and what isn't for the last several hundred years. At a moment when the term ontology was left alone like a piece of well chewed old chewing gum that no one wants to have anything to do with, object-oriented ontology (OOO) has put it back on the table. The coral reef isn't going anywhere and once you have discovered it, you can't un-discover it. And it seems to be teeming with strange facts. The first fact is that the entities in the reef—we call them “objects” somewhat provocatively—constitute all there is: from doughnuts to dogfish to the Dog Star to Dobermans to Snoop Dogg. People, plastic clothes pegs, piranhas and particles are all objects. And they are all pretty much the same, at this depth. There is not much of a distinction between life and non-life (as there isn't in contemporary life science). And there is not much of a distinction between intelligence and non-intelligence (as there is in contemporary artificial intelligence theory). A lot of these distinctions are made by humans, for humans (anthropocentrism). And the concept autonomy has come into play in policing such distinctions. In this essay I shall to try to liberate autonomy for the sake of nonhumans. I shall do so by parsing carefully the title, which is taken from Hakim Bey's work The Temporary Autonomous Zone .8 First we shall explore the term autonomous . Then we shall explore what the full meaning of zone is. Finally, we shall investigate what temporary means. Each of these terms is of great value. An object withdraws from access. This means that its very own parts can't access it. Since an object's parts can't fully express the object, the object is not reducible to its parts. OOO is anti-reductionist. But OOO is also anti-holist. An object can't be reduced to its “whole” either, “reduced upwards” as it were. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. So we have a strange irreductionist situation in which an object is reducible neither to its parts nor to its whole. A coral reef is made of coral, fish, seaweed, plankton and so on. But one of these things on its own doesn't embody part of a reef. Yet the reef just is an assemblage of these particular parts. You can't find a coral reef in a parking lot. In this way, the vibrant realness of a reef is kept safe both from its parts and from its whole. Moreover, the reef is safe from being mistaken for a parking lot. Objects can't be reduced to tiny Lego bricks such as atoms that can be reused in other things. Nor can be reduced upwards into instantiations of a global process. A coral reef is an expression of the biosphere or of evolution, yes; but so is this sentence, and we ought to be able to distinguish between coral reefs and sentences in English. The preceding facts go under the heading of undermining . Any attempt to undermine an object—in thought, or with a gun, or with heat, or with the ravages of time or global warming—will not get at the withdrawn essence of the object. By essence is meant something very different from essentialism . This is because essentialism depends upon some aspect of an object that OOO holds to be a mere appearance of that object, an appearance-for some object. This reduction to appearance holds even if that object for which the appearance occurs is the object itself! Even a coral reef can't grasp its essential coral reefness. In essentialism, a superficial appearance is taken for the essence of a thing, or of things in general. In thinking essentialism we may be able to discern another way of avoiding OOO. This is what Harman has christened overmining .? The overminer decides that some things are more real than others: say for example human perception. Then the overminer decides that other things are only granted realness status by somehow coming into the purview of the more real entity. When I measure a photon, when I see a coral reef, it becomes what it is. But when I measure a photon, I never measure the actual photon. Indeed, since at the quantum scale to measure means “to hit with a photon or an electron beam” (or whatever), measurement, perception ( aisthesis ), and doing become the same. What I “see” are deflections, tracks in a diffusion cloud chamber or interference patterns. Far from underwriting a world of pure illusion where the mind is king, quantum theory is one of the very first truly rigorous realisms, thinking its objects as irreducibly resistant to full comprehension, by anything.9 So far we have made objects safe from being swallowed up by larger objects and broken down into smaller objects—undermining. And so far we have made objects safe from being mere projections or reflections of some supervenient entity—overmining. That's quite a degree of autonomy. Everything in the coral reef, from the fish to a single coral lifeform to a tiny plankton, is autonomous. But so is the coral reef itself. So are the heads of the coral, a community of tiny polyps. So is each individual head. Each object is like one of Leibniz's monads, in that each one contains a potentially infinite regress of other objects; and around each object, there is a potentially infinite progress of objects, as numerous multiverse theories are now also arguing. But the infinity, the uncountability, is more radical than Leibniz, since there is nothing stopping a group of objects from being an object, just as a coral reef is something like a society of corals. Each object is “a little world made cunningly” (John Donne).10 We are indeed approaching something like the political valance of autonomy . The existence of an object is irreducibly a matter of coexistence. Objects contain other objects, and are contained “in” other objects. Let us, however, explore further the ramifications of the autonomy of objects. We will see that this mereological approach (based on the study of parts) only gets at part of the astonishing autonomy of things. Yet there are some more things to be said about mereology before we move on. Consider the fact that since objects can't be undermined or overmined, it means that there is strictly no bottom object . There is no object to which all other objects can be reduced, so that we can say everything we want to say about them, hypothetically at least, based on the behavior of the bottom object. The idea that we could is roughly E.O Wilson's theory of consilience .11 Likewise, there is no object from which all things can be produced, no top object . Objects are not emanations from some primordial One or from a prime mover. There might be a god, or gods. Suppose there were. In an OOO universe even a god would not know the essential ins and outs of a piece of coral. Unlike even some forms of atheism, the existence of god (or nonexistence) doesn't matter very much for OOO. If you really want to be an atheist, you might consider giving OOO a spin. If there is no top object and no bottom object, neither is there a middle object . That is, there is no such thing as a space, or time, “in” which objects float. There is no environment distinct from objects. There is no Nature (I capitalize the word to reinforce a sense of its deceptive artificiality). There is no world, if by world we mean a kind of “rope” that connects things together.12 All such connections must be emergent properties of objects themselves. And this of course is well in line with post-Einsteinian physics, in which spacetime just is the product of objects, and which may even be an emergent property of a certain scale of object larger than 10?¹?cm).13 Objects don't sit in a box of space or time. It's the other way around: space and time emanate from objects. How does this happen? OOO tries to produce an explanation from objects themselves. Indeed, the ideal situation would be to rely on just one single object. Otherwise we are stuck with a reality in which objects require other entities to function, which would result in some kind of undermining or overmining. We shall see that we have all the fuel we need “inside” one object to have time and space, and even causality. We shall discover that rather than being some kind of machinery or operating system that underlies objects, causality itself is a phenomenon that floats ontologically “in front of” them. In so doing, we will move from the notion of autonomy and begin approaching a full exploration of the notion of zone , which was promised at the outset of this essay. Since an object is withdrawn, even “from itself,” it is a self-contradictory being. It is itself and not-itself, or in a slightly more expanded version, there is a rift between essence and appearance within an object (as well as “between” them). This rift can't be the same as the clichéd split between substance and accidents , which is the default ontology. On this view, things are like somewhat boring cupcakes with somewhat less boring sugar sprinkles on them of different colors and shapes. But on the OOO view, what is called substance is just another limited slice of an object, a way of apprehending something that is ontologically fathoms deeper. What is called substance and what is called accidence are just on the side of what this essay calls appearance. The rift (Greek, chorismos ) between essence and appearance means that an object presents us with something like what in logic is known as the Liar: some version of the sentence “This sentence is false.” The sentence is true, which means that it is a lie, which means that it is false. Or the sentence is false, which means that it is telling the truth, which means that it is true. Now logic since Aristotle has tried desperately to quarantine such beasts in small backwaters and side streets so that they don't act too provocatively.14 But if OOO holds, then at least one very significant thing in the universe is both itself and not-itself: the object. An object is p ? ¬p. To cope with this fact, we shall need some kind of paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic logic, one that is not allergic to dialetheias (double-truthed things). Yet if we accept that objects are dialetheic, p ? ¬p, we can derive all kinds of things easily from objects. Consider the fact of motion. If objects only occupy one location “in” space at any “one” time, then Zeno's paradoxes will apply to trying to think how an object moves. Yet motion seems like a basic, simple fact of our world. Either everything is just an illusion and nothing really moves at all (Parmenides). Or objects are here and not-here “at the same time.”15 This latter possibility provides the basic setup for all the motion we could wish for. Objects are not “in” time and space. Rather, they “time” (a verb) and “space.” They produce time and space. It would be better to think these verbs as intransitive rather than transitive, in the manner of dance or revolt . They emanate from objects, yet they are not the object. “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” (Yeats).16 The point being, that for there to be a question, there must be a distinction—or there must not be (p ? ¬p).17 It becomes impossible to tell: “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don't know whether it's pretense or not.”18 In this notion of the emergence of time and space from an object we can begin to understand the term zone . Zone can mean belt , something that winds around something else. We talk of temperate zones and war zones. A zone is a place where a certain action is taking place: the zone winds around, it radiates heat, bullets fly, armies are defeated. To speak of an autonomous zone is to speak of a place that a certain political act has carved out of some other entity. Cynically, Tibet is called TAR, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for this very reason. In this phrase, Region tries to emulate zone : it sounds as if the place has its own rules, but of course, it is very much under the control of China. What action is taking place? “[N]ot something that just is what it is, here and now, without mystery, but something like a quest…a tone on its way calling forth echoes and responses…water seeking its liquidity in the sunlight rippling across the cypresses in the back of the garden.”19 If as suggested earlier there is no functional difference between substance and accidence; if there is no difference between perceiving and doing; if there is no real difference between sentience and non-sentience—then causality itself is a strange, ultimately nonlocal aesthetic phenomenon. A phenomenon, moreover, that emanates from objects themselves, wavering in front of them like the astonishingly beautiful real illusion conjured in this quotation of Alphonso Lingis. Lingis's sentence does what it says, casting a compelling, mysterious spell, the spell of causality, like a demonic force field. A real illusion: if we knew it was an illusion, if it were just an illusion, it would cease to waver. It would not be an illusion at all. We would be in the real of noncontradiction. Since it is like an illusion, we can never be sure: “What constitutes pretense…” A zone is what Lingis calls a level . A zone is not entirely a matter of “free will”: this concept has already beaten down most objects into abject submission. Objects are far more threateningly autonomous, and sensually autonomous, than the Kantian version of autonomy cited in the first paragraph of this essay. A zone is not studiously decided upon by an earnest committee before it goes into action. One of its predominant features is that it is already happening . We find ourselves in it, all of a sudden, in the late afternoon as the shadows lengthen around a city square, giving rise to an uncanny sensation of having been here before. Objects emit zones. Wherever I find myself a zone is already happening, an autonomous zone. It is the nonautonomous zones that are impositions on what is already the case. Or rather, these zones are autonomous zones that exclude and police. They are brittle. Every object is autonomous, but some objects try to maintain themselves through rigidity and brittleness, like (and such as) a police state. Paradoxically, the more rigidly one tries to exclude contradiction, the more virulent become the dialetheias that are possible. I can get around “This sentence is false” by imagining that there are metalanguages that explain what counts as a sentence. Then I can decide that this isn't a real sentence. This is basically Alfred Tarski's strategy, since he invented the notion of metalanguage specifically to cope with dialetheias.20 For example we might claim that sentences such as “This sentence is false” are neither true nor false. But then you can imagine a strengthened version of the Liar such as: “This sentence is not true”; or “This sentence is neither true nor false.” And we can go on adding to the strengthened Liar if the counter-attack tries to build immunity by specifying some fourth thing that a sentence can be besides true, false, and neither true nor false: “This sentence is false, or neither true nor false, or the fourth thing.” And so on.21 It seems as if language becomes more brittle the more it tries to police the Liars of this world. Why? I believe that this increasing brittleness is a symptom of a deep fact about reality. What is this deep fact? Simply that there are objects, that these objects are withdrawn, and that they are walking contradictions. This means indeed that (as Lacan put it) “there is no metalanguage,” since a metalanguage would function as a “middle object” that gave coherency and evenness to the others.22 Since there is no metalanguage, there is no rising above the disturbing illusory play of causality. This may even have political implications: no global critique is therefore possible, and attempts to smooth out or totalize are doomed to fail. To think the zone is to think the notion of temporary , which we shall now begin to discuss in greater detail. The zone is not in time: rather it “times.” But because a zone is an emanation of an object, it is based on a wavering fragility, since objects are p ? ¬p. When an object is born, that means that it has broken free of some other object. An object can be born because it and other objects are fragile. If not, no movement would be possible. Objects contain the seeds of their own destruction, a dialetheic sentence that says something like “This sentence cannot be proved.” Kurt Gödel argues that every true system of propositions contains at least one sentence that the system cannot prove. In order to be true, the system must have a minimum incoherence. To be real, it has to be fragile. Imagine a record player. Now imagine a record called I Cannot Be Played on This Record Player . When you play it on this record player, it produces sympathetic vibrations that cause the record player to shudder apart. No matter how many defense mechanisms you build in, there will always be the possibility of at least one record that destroys the record player.23 That is what being physical is. An object is inherently fragile because it is both itself and not-itself. When the rift between appearance and essence collapses, that is called destruction, ending, death. When an object breaks, several new objects are born. An opera singer sings a loud note in tune with the resonant frequency of a wine glass. (See the movie included below.) The singing is a zone, an autonomous level of intensity, opening a rift between appearance and essence. The glass ripples—for a moment it is nakedly a glass and a not-glass—almost as if it were having an orgasm, a little death. It is caught in the rift of the singing. Then its structure can't handle the coherence of the sound waves, and it breaks. It is incoherence and inconsistency that is the mark of existence, not consistency and noncontradiction. When things break or die, they become coherent. Essence disappears into appearance. I become the memories of friends. A glass becomes a dancing wave. Instantly, there are glass fragments, new temporary autonomous zones. The fragments have broken free from the glass. They are no longer its parts, but emanate their own time and space, becoming perhaps accidental weapons as they bury themselves in my flesh. Thus Hakim Bey's instructions on creating temporary autonomous zones oscillate disturbingly between performance art and politics, circus clowning and revolution. To play with the aesthetic is to play with causality, to rip from the sensual ether emanating from things new regions, new zones. Anarchist politics is the creation of fresh objects in a reality without a top or a bottom object, or for that matter a middle object: Everything in nature is perfectly real including consciousness, there's absolutely nothing to worry about. Not only have the chains of the Law been broken, they never existed; demons never guarded the stars, the Empire never got started, Eros never grew a beard. … There is no becoming, no revolution, no struggle, no path; already you're the monarch of your own skin—your inviolable freedom waits to be completed only by the love of other monarchs: a politics of dream, urgent as the blueness of sky.24 Bey imagines that this is because chaos is a primordial “undifferentiated oneness-of-being.” A Parmenides or a Spinoza or a Laruelle would read this a certain way. Individual objects, or decisions to talk about this rather than that, are just maggot-like things crawling around on the surface of the giant cheese of oneness.25 Yet he also describes chaos as “Primordial uncarved block, sole worshipful monster, inert & spontaneous, more ultraviolet than any mythology.” This image is of an inconsistent object, not of an undifferentiated field. An object, indeed, that can be distinguished from other things. If not, then the first part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , subtitled “The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism,” is a kind of onto-theology. Onto-theology proclaims that some things are more real than others. Bey, however, is writing poetically, and thus ambiguously. We are at liberty to read “undifferentiated oneness-of-being” as something like the irreducibility of a thing to its parts and so forth (undermining and overmining). This certainly seems closer to the language in the following paragraph: “There is no becoming … already you're the monarch of your own skin.”26 On this view, there is no difference between art and politics: “When ugliness, poor design & stupid waste are forced upon you, turn Luddite, throw your shoe in the works, retaliate.” Since Romanticism this has been the war cry of the vanguard artist.27 To say to is to fall prey to the tired axioms of the avant-garde, and we think we know how the game goes. But OOO is not simply a way to advocate “new and improved” versions of this shock-the-bourgeoisie boredom. Bey's text is certainly full enough of that. Rather, since causality as such is aesthetic, and since nonhumans are not that different from humans, the new approach would be to form aesthetic–causal alliances with nonhumans. These alliances would have to resist becoming brittle, whether that brittleness is right wing (authoritarianism) or left wing (the endless maze of critique). No “ism,” especially not the ultimate forms, nihilism and cynicism, is in any sense effective at this point. All forms of brittleness are based on the mistaken assumption that there is a metalanguage and that therefore “Anything you can do, I can do meta.” I will not be listing any approaches here, as Bey does. Such lists and manifestos belong to the vanguardism that no longer works. Why? Not because of some marvelous revolution in human consciousness, but because nonhumans have so successfully impinged upon human social, psychic and aesthetic space. It is the time after the end of the world. That happened in 1945, when a thin layer of radioactive materials was deposited in Earth's crust. Geology now calls it this era the Anthropocene . Ironically, this period, named after humans, is the moment at which even the most thick headed of us make decisive contact with nonhumans, from mercury in our blood to manta rays to magnesium. Richard Dawkins, Pat Robertson and Lady Gaga all have to deal with global warming and mass extinction, somehow. We now live in an Age of Asymmetry marked by a skewed, spiraling relationship between vast knowledge and vast nonhuman things—both become vaster and vaster because of one another and for the same reasons.28 This means that coming up with the perfect attitude or the perfect aesthetic prescription just won't work any more. Even the most hardened anthropocentrist now has to pay through the nose for basic food supplies, and has to use more sunscreen. Whether he knows it or acknowledges it, he is already acting with regard towards nonhumans. There is nothing special to think, no special critique that will get rid of the stains of coexistence. The problem won't fit into the well-established modern boxes, which is why the “mystical,” “spiritual” quality of Bey's prose is welcome. Of course, when I put it this way, you may immediately close off and decide that I am talking about perfect attitudes after all, or something outside of politics, or other ways that the radical left marshals to police its thinking of the nonhuman. Because that is what is really at stake in all this: the nonhuman in its coexistence with the human—bosons, gods, clouds, spirits, lifeforms, experiences, the sunlight rippling across the cypresses. Bey begins to get at this in a Latour litany in the second part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , “The Assassins”: Pomegranate, mulberry, persimmon, the erotic melancholy of cypresses, membrane-pink shirazi roses, braziers of meccan aloes & benzoin, stiff shafts of ottoman tulips, carpets spread like make-believe gardens on actual lawns—a pavilion set with a mosaic of calligrammes—a willow, a stream with watercress—a fountain crystalled underneath with geometry— the metaphysical scandal of bathing odalisques, of wet brown cupbearers hide-&-seeking in the foliage—“water, greenery, beautiful faces.”29 This will be conveniently dismissed as orientalism. If we're never allowed to escape the crumbling prison of modernity for fear of imperialism there is truly no hope. In a similar way, the fear of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is very often staged from a place that just is anthropocentrism .30 Critique turns into ressentiment . An object radiates a zone that is aesthetic and therefore causal. Because objects “time” they are temporary. Not because they exist “in” time that eventually gets the better of them. Their very existence implies the possibility of their non-existence. Since objects are not consistent, they can cease to exist. But nothing, no one, will ever be able to insert a blade between appearance and existence, even thought there is a rift there. Now that's what I call autonomy. NOTES 1. John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 96. 2. P. B. Medawar and J. S. Medawar, The Life Science: Current Ideas in Biology (London: Wildwood House, 1977), 8. 3. David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 4. Antony Colynet, A True History of the Civil Warres in France (London, 1591), 480. 5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996) 62–71. 6. Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002). 7. Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991). 8. Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Ripley: Zero Books, 2011), 7–18. 9. This is not the place to get into an argument about quantum theory, but I have argued that quanta also do not endorse a world that I can't speak about because it is only real when measured. This world is that of the reigning Standard Model proposed by Niels Bohr and challenged by De Broglie and Bohm (and now the cosmologist Valentini, among others). See Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology,” Qui Parle 19.2 (Spring–Summer, 2011), 163–190. 10. John Donne, Holy Sonnets 15, in The Major Works: Including Songs and Sonnets and Sermons , ed. John Carey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 11. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998). 12. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (Washington: Regnery, 1968), 243. 13. Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory (London: Penguin, 2006); Petr Horava, “Quantum Gravity at a Lifshitz Point,” arXiv:0901.3775v2 [hep-th]. 14. Graham Priest, In Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2006), passim: the most notable recent quarantine officers have been Tarski, Russell, and Frege. 15. Priest, In Contradiction , 172–181. 16. William Butler Yeats, “Among School Children,” Collected Poems , ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1996). 17. Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3.3 (Autumn, 1973), 27–33 (30). 18. Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire, Livre III: Les psychoses (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1981), 48. See Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 206. 19. Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 29. 20. Priest, In Contradiction , 9–27. 21. See Graham Priest and Francesco Berto, “ Dialetheism ,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 22. Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection , tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), 311. 23. The analogy can be found at length in Douglas Hofstadter, “Contracrostipunctus,” Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 75–81. 24. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 25. This is closest to the language of François Laruelle in Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2011) 179. 26. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 27. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 28. For further discussion see Timothy Morton, “From Modernity to the Anthropocene: Ecology and Art in the Age of Asymmetry,” The International Social Science Journal 209 (forthcoming). 29. Bey, “ The Assassins ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 30. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 75–76. (shrink)

In 1954 H. L. A. Hart wrote that Austin's work has ‘never, since his death … been ignored’. If it never has been completely ignored, interest in it has periodically waxed and waned. The interest definitely waxed in the 1980s. More books were published about Austin in this period than in any other decade since his death in 1859. Although this literature contains discussions of some of the nineteenth-century responses to his work, they are not the focus of it. Certain (...) of the responses remain completely in the dark, while there is more light to shed on at least some of the others. In short, our knowledge of nineteenth-century interpretations of Austin's legal philosophy is very incomplete. (shrink)

À l'école d'Édith Stein -- À la recherche du geste intérieur -- Révéler la presence -- Anthropologie phénoménologique et théorie de l'éducation dans l'oeuvre d'Édith Stein (Résumé).